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THE IRRATIONAL AUDITOR AND IRRATIONAL LIABILITY
by
A. C. Pritchard
This Article argues that less liabilityfor auditors in certain areas might
encourage more accurate and useful financial statements, or at least
equally accurate statements at a lower cost. Audit quality is promoted by
three incentives: reputation, regulation, and litigation. When we take
reputation and regulation into account, exposing auditors to potentially
massive liability may undermine the effectiveness of reputation and
regulation, thereby diminishing integrity of auditedfinancial statements.
The relation of litigation to the other incentives that promote audit
quality has become more important in light of the sea change that
occurred in the regulation of the auditingprofession with the adoption of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Given these fundamental changes in the
regulatory backdrop, I argue that the marginal benefit of litigation has
been substantially diminished and in many cases that it is likely to be
ineffective in promoting greater audit quality. I propose a knowledge
standardfor auditorliability in securitiesfraud cases.
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Auditors, as a group, have never been all that glamorous. Until recently,
accountants in general have been viewed as a dull crowd, the sort of people
with whom you would not want to be caught in corner of the room at a cocktail
party. Auditors' reputation has gotten a bit edgier in the last few years-the
perception of the profession has gone from boring to sleazy. After the nowfamiliar litany of corporate scandals-Waste Management, Sunbeam, Enron,
WorldCom, etc., etc.-auditors came into general disrepute, the object of
derision by the hosts of late night talk shows.
Of greater consequence than becoming the butt of jokes, the auditors
found themselves in the sights of both Congress and prosecutors, the whipping
boys for all the greed that tainted corporate America in the fin de sikcle excess
of the tech bubble. Arthur Andersen collapsed under the weight of an
indictment arising out of the Enron affair, which led to the firm's criminal
conviction. By the time the Supreme Court eventually overturned that
conviction, it was far too
late to revive the one-time member of the accounting
1
profession's Big Five.
It was also too late to repeal the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in 2002,
which has a similar punitive feel to it. If any consistent theme can be found in
the hodgepodge of reforms found in that law, it is Congress's intention to
punish auditors for the sins of Arthur Andersen. Going forward, Congress
meant to keep the remaining members of the Big Four on a tight leash. And
holding the leash would be a new quasi-governmental overseer, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB, or
"Peekaboo," is charged specifically with keeping tabs on the auditors of public
companies. Consequently, unlike the SEC, which has demonstrated a tendency
to be distracted by the scandal dujour, the PCAOB has a narrow focus that will
tend to push it toward close oversight of the accounting industry. What else
does it have to do?
Given all the punishment meted out on top of the so recent and widespread
public opprobrium toward the profession, it is more than a little surprising how
well accountants are doing these days. Enrollment in undergraduate accounting
2
programs is booming. Who would have thought that accounting would become
a "hot" career path? The question of why bean counting has become so popular
is readily answered-audit fees have sky-rocketed in the wake of accounting
reforms passed by Congress as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

1 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).
2 Claude Solaik, Schools Open New Chapter in Accounting Offerings,
Bus. NEWS, July 22, 2005, at 5B.
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The question raised by auditors' new-found prosperity is whether this
increase in fees is matched by commensurate benefits for investors. Are
investors receiving better, more accurate information? Almost certainly. Is it
worth the cost? We don't know.
The most controversial of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions has been section
404, which requires the auditors to assess the integrity of the client's internal
controls. 3 This requirement has been criticized for dramatically increasing the
cost of audits. These criticisms have been supported by recent work by
Eldridge and Kealey, who find that audit fees paid by a sample of 97 public
companies increased, on average, from $3.5 million to $5.8 million, which can
largely be attributed to section 404 compliance costs. 4 This increase in audit
fees suggests that perhaps Congress was not as anxious to punish auditors as
one might have thought from the legislators' public fulminations against the
industry at the height of the accounting crisis. This surprisingly large spike in
auditing revenues suggests that the profession is quite healthy, a welcome
development for an industry in which auditing had become a loss leader for
selling other services. "Don't fling us into that briar patch, Brer Congress," one
can almost hear the accountants saying.
The PCAOB has been criticized for not taking steps to make the costs of
section 404 compliance more manageable. William McDonough, chairman of
the PCAOB, in a recent interview attempted to shift the blame for the recent
spike in the cost of auditing from regulatory requirements to the auditors'
(irrational?) fear of litigation:
Auditors have to use judgment. They have a great deal of leeway. But in
a litigious society, there's no question that some auditors may be
protecting themselves by doing work that all of us might think
objectively is excessive. That I want to see eliminated. The leadership of
the firms agrees. But [auditors] have to be convinced that their leaders
will not be pleased by excessive work. 5
Unraveling whether the spike in auditing costs stems from a paranoid fear
of litigation or regulatory overkill by the Congress, the SEC, and PCAOB is a
tall order. It is difficult to quarrel, however, with McDonough's suggestion that
fear of litigation may drive auditors to employ auditing procedures that would
not otherwise be warranted. It also seems clear that anticipated litigation costs
are a substantial portion of the fees that auditors charge public companies.
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2001-2003).
4 Susan W. Eldridge & Burch T. Kealey, SOX Costs: Auditor Attestation under Section

404 (Working Paper, University of Nebraska at Omaha, June 2005). Effectively conceding
that there is a real problem here, the SEC recently delayed implementation of the § 404
requirements for smaller companies in response to a recommendation by its Advisory
Committee on Smaller Public Companies. Michael Bologna, SEC's Small Company Panel
Recommends Relief From Section 404 FilingRequirements, 37 SEC. REG. & LAW REP. 1389,

1389 (2005).
5 Mr. McDonough, You Have The Floor: The Accounting Watchdog on SarbanesOxley, Excessive Auditing, andinvestor Trust, Bus. WK., Aug. 1, 2005, at 56.

6 Ronald A. Dye, Auditing Standards,Legal Liability, andAuditor Wealth, 101 J. POL.
ECON. 887, 887-90 (1993); Dan A. Simunic & Michael T. Stein, The Impact of Litigation
HeinOnline -- 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 21 2006
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For many academic commentators, a renewed fear of litigation among
auditors is a welcome development. In the wake of the salient accounting
scandals, the professoriate explained that auditors had strayed from the path of
righteousness because of the substantially reduced litigation exposure that they
faced in the late 1990s. Accountants were getting a free pass, the story goes,
after the Supreme Court read aiding and abetting liability out of Rule 10b-5 and

Congress discouraged securities litigation more generally with its adoption of

was a healthy
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 7 What was needed
8
dose of liability exposure to bring the auditors back into line.
More lawsuits are the standard cure prescribed by law professors for the
ills of society-haul the bad guys into court and make them pay. In this
context, however, there are other factors at play-some structural and some
behavioral-suggesting that more liability may not improve matters. Liability

is only one tool for promoting audit quality: reputation and regulation also play
vital roles. Let's call these three incentives the triad of audit quality.
Auditor reputation has always been important, leading some to suggest
that jeopardizing it would be "irrational." 9 That has not changed. The
regulatory environment, however, has shifted in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley
world. Auditors now operate under the watchful eye of independent audit

Risk on Audit Pricing: A Review of the Economics and the Evidence, 15 AUDITING 119,
120-33 (Supp. 1996).
7 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid, " 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1409-10 (2001-2002); Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale,
Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the
Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1167, 1182 (2003).
8 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 353 (2004); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability,
77 S. CAL. L. REv. 53, 53-57 (2003); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?:A
Proposalfor a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 492 (2001).
9 Judge Easterbrook had this to say about auditor reputation in the course of discussing
a securities fraud complaint against an audit firm for failure to adequately plead scienter:
The complaint does not allege that E[rnst] & W[hinney] had anything to gain from
any fraud by [it's client]. An accountant's greatest asset is its reputation for
honesty, followed closely by its reputation for careful work. Fees for two years'
audits could not approach the losses E & W would suffer from a perception that-it
would muffle a client's fraud. And although the interests of E & W's partners and
associates who worked on the Continental audits may have diverged from the
firm's... covering up fraud and imposing large damages on the partnership will
bring a halt to the most promising career. E & W's partners shared none of the
gain from any fraud and were exposed to a large fraction of the loss. It would have
been irrational for any of them to have joined cause with [the client].
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990).
Robert Prentice is critical of Easterbrook's point here, arguing that an "irrational
auditor" may jeopardize a firm's reputation by signing off on misleading financial
statements. Prentice argues at length that behavioral law and economics demonstrates the
likelihood that auditors will succumb to this seemingly irrational risk to their firm's
reputation. Robert F. Prentice, The Case of the IrrationalAuditor: A BehavioralInsight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 133, 141-42 (2000). For a response to
Prentice, see Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REv. 1, 49 n.228 (2003).
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committees and are subject to thoroughgoing and intrusive regulation and
inspection by the PCAOB, so regulation has been ramped up. Less clear is
whether the third side of the audit quality triad-the threat of litigation-will
have that much effect in encouraging quality audits in this new environment. If
auditors "irrationally" ignore reputation and regulation, will litigation help steer
them back to the path of virtue? The cognitive limitations of individual auditors
are fueled by the unavoidable affiliation that the members of the audit team will
have with the audit client's management. That affiliation colors everything that
the auditor does in the performance of its audit, making the auditor particularly
vulnerable to cognitive errors. Unfortunately, these cognitive errors are
particularly difficult to overcome. Punishing audit firms for mistakes that they
cannot realistically overcome is a recipe for massive wealth transfers that will
ultimately be passed along to shareholders in the form of higher audit fees.
Worse yet, those wealth transfers will be accompanied by heavy deadweight
losses in the form of litigation costs. The third component of the audit quality
triad is potentially its weakest leg.
My goal here is to raise, in a very preliminary way, the question of
whether less liability for auditors in certain areas might encourage more
accurate and useful financial statements, or at least equally accurate statements
at a lower cost. When we take reputation and regulation into account, exposing
auditors to potentially massive liability may in some respects hurt more than
help. My thesis is that exposing audit firms to billion dollar settlements and
judgments may undermine the effectiveness of reputation and regulation,
thereby diminishing integrity of audited financial statements. Liability should
enhance reputation and regulation, not undercut them.
I proceed as follows. Part I explores the role of reputation, including: the
economics of auditing, the incentives that auditors have to perform quality
audits, and the difficulties inherent in measuring audit quality. Part II briefly
describes the sea change that occurred in the regulation of the auditing
profession with the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Given these
fundamental changes in the regulatory backdrop, Part III then explores how the
new regulatory regime interacts with the liability regime, and how all three legs
of the audit quality triad interact with the psychological strengths and
weaknesses of auditors. I offer some preliminary thoughts on the appropriate
standard for auditor liability in Part IV. Part V concludes.
I.

A.

THE ECONOMICS OF AUDITING

The Value ofAuditing

Although they are loath to admit it, auditors thrive on dishonesty.
Dishonesty by corporate insiders makes the job of auditors much harder, but
without it, the demand for their services would be much reduced. In a world
where everyone were honest, external auditing would offer relatively slight
benefits for most users of financial statements-companies would report their
assets, liabilities, and financial returns in a straightforward way, and investors,
HeinOnline -- 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 23 2006
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creditors, employees, and suppliers could take the company's word that its
financial health was accurately represented. Accounting would still be
important, of course, as would generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), because of the importance that financial statement users put on
comparability. But the demand for external auditing of those accounts would be
considerably diminished. To be sure, companies would occasionally make
mistakes in the application of accounting principles, but the mistakes would be
randomly distributed, sometimes making the company look better and
sometimes worse. There would be little incentive to double-check the work of
the company's accountants. Some investors might value the more accurate
financial statements produced by review by an expert outside auditor. The
value of such review would not be all that great, however, in a world where
company accountants made a good faith effort to comply with generally
accepted accounting principles and any errors that they did make were
unbiased.
Fortunately for auditors, not all companies are honest. Company insiders
will occasionally have incentives to shade the truth: job security, option grants,
an impending stock offering, etc. The result is that a small percentage of
companies-who knows how many-will risk their credibility with the
financial markets by actively misreporting their financial results. A larger
number of companies are likely to have their financial statements infected by
wishful thinking.' 0 Generally accepted accounting principles frequently leave
some room for interpretation and discretion, and chief financial officers are apt
to persuade themselves that the interpretation that puts the company's financial
health in the most favorable light is the one that is justified. An independent
auditor can be a helpful check on the tendency to wear rose colored glasses.
Moreover, we are inclined to think that more companies would stray from the
path of truth and/or succumb to wishful thinking if no one were checking on
them.
Auditors do check, although they recurringly complain about the difficulty
of checking. Like it or not, auditors have put themselves in the integrity
business. Essentially, auditors earn their living by renting their reputation.' By
attesting to the accuracy of a company's financial statements (more precisely,
that the company's financial statements conform to generally accepted
accounting principles), the auditor lends its credibility-a critical asset-to that
company. The certification of a company's financial reports provided by an
accounting firm is only as good as the accounting firm's reputation for doing a
thorough audit unhampered by conflict of interest. In an unregulated market, no

10 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
CorporationsMislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA.
L. REv. 101, 107-08 (1997).
1l Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 53, 93-94 (1986).
HeinOnline -- 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 24 2006
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one would pay for a shoddy audit because the auditor's attestation
12 would confer
no additional credibility to the company's financial statements.
Generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) are intended to ensure a
minimum quality level for audits. But those standards set a floor, not a ceiling:
auditors are certainly free to do a better job than mandated by GAAS. And the
greater the auditor's reputation for credibility, the more it can charge for its
attestation services.1 3 Although an auditor's reputation is built upon the quality
of the audits that it performs, the incentive to perform thorough audits to
maintain and enhance the audit firm's reputation must be balanced against
competitive pressures to keep the cost of audits manageable. The question is
whether the reputational incentives are sufficient to maintain acceptable audit
quality. Basic economic theory tells us that an auditor should have the incentive
to refine its audit methodologies until the marginal increase in the cost of the
audit is equal to the marginal benefit conferred on the client company. 14 That
marginal benefit takes the form of enhanced credibility for the client
company's financial statements, which should provide more favorable contract
terms and a reduced cost of capital for the client.
B.

Assessing the Quality ofAuditing

This straightforward economic account of the role of auditor reputation
makes sense only as long as we ignore information costs. The problem with the
story is that the quality of the accountant's audit may not be readily apparent to
the intended audience for the auditor's attestation, i.e., creditors, suppliers,
customers, and most of all, investors. The procedures generally followed by an
auditor will not be transparent, much less the quality of the audit performed by
the audit team assigned at an individual company, which may or may not
follow all of those procedures (which will necessarily vary with the size of the
company, the type of business it is in, and the audit team's assessment of the
litigation risk). Moreover, the intensity of effort from the audit team members
is likely to be an important determinant of audit quality and that intensity will
be largely unobservable. Finally, audit procedures will need to evolve to keep
pace with the evolution of business practice. Are the auditors keeping up? For
the outside observer, the independent audit is largely a black box.
And this difficulty in assessing the quality of audits will be made
significantly harder when a particular audit team deviates from the firm's
12 Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-PartyLiability Necessary?,
17 J. LEG. STuD. 295, 302 (1988) ("The clients' willingness to pay will depend ultimately on
the quality of the information produced.").
13 Id. at 312 ("The good accountant can charge a high price to clients because they can
use the accountant's good name to sell their securities at a premium or to borrow at lower
interest rates."). Fung and Gul provide evidence that firms that provide higher quality audits
are able to charge higher fees. Simon Fung & Ferdinand A. Gul, Evidence of Audit Quality
Difference Among Big Five Auditors (Working Paper, The Hong Kong Polytechnic
University, 2005).
14 Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory
of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON. 613, 613 (1983).
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established procedures. Individual employees of an accounting firm may see
their career prospects as being more closely tied to the success or survival of a
particular client, rather than the overall reputation of the firm. Such an
employee may be tempted to give in to a pressure from an important client to
sign off on a questionable accounting treatment.
This concern that auditors may come under the sway of important clients
has been exacerbated as accounting has become more complex, requiring
independent auditors to spend a larger percentage of their time with each client.
To cite one well-worn example, "Enron appears to have accounted for all of the
billings of the lead partner assigned to the Enron audit and for several members
of his team.' 15 For that partner and his team, keeping Enron management happy
was a (the?) top priority. From the auditing firm's perspective, however,
maintaining objectivity is critical; public findings that the auditor failed to live
up to its reputation can be devastating, as Arthur Andersen learned. And this
impact apparently spilled over to Andersen's other clients.16
The client pressure that brought Andersen down has become more acute as
companies have increasingly relied on bonus and other incentive compensation
schemes that depend heavily on accounting results. The value of stock options,
too, may be heavily determined by reported earnings. So the insiders will
frequently have strong incentives to see that the numbers come out at a certain
level.
To make matters worse, the problem of assessing audit quality is
aggravated by the recent push to make accounting standards reflect economic
value rather than historical costs. An audit focused on making sure that assets
have not been misappropriated by management is a manageable task that is
reasonably likely to succeed. An audit attempting to determine whether the
value of the corporation is accurately represented is much more likely to fail
because there are so many variables that go into such a valuation, and many of
those variables are vulnerable to subjectivity in measurement. Absent a welldeveloped and liquid market for an asset, economic values 17are notoriously
difficult to quantify, opening up room for greater manipulation.
In sum, consumers of audits may have difficulty distinguishing rigorous
audits from sloppy ones. If so, auditors will not be able to capitalize fully on
their efforts to do a thorough audit, which may tempt the auditor to cut
corners. 18 Cutting corners reduces the auditor's expense, thereby bolstering the
auditor's profit margin. Even if the firm avoids such temptations, employees of
the firm will be similarly tempted to cut comers, particularly in the face of

15 Macey & Sale, supra note 7, at 1170.

16 Paul K. Chaney & Kirk L. Philipich, Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit
Failure, 40 J.ACCT. REs. 1221, 1221 (2002) (finding a negative abnormal stock price
reaction for Andersen clients after Andersen admitted shredding Enron-related documents).

17 George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting Before

andAfter Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1348 (2003).
18 See J.A. Borzovsky & F.M. Richardson, The Effects of Information Availability on
the Benefits Accruedfrom Enhancing Audit-Firm Reputation, 23 ACCT. ORG. & Soc'Y 767,

767-68 (1998).
HeinOnline -- 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 26 2006

2006]

THE IRRATIONAL AUDITOR AND IRRATIONAL LIABILITY

27

client pressure. Most of the time such shortcuts will have no adverse
consequences, so monitoring to discourage agency costs of this sort is likely to
be expensive and far from fool-proof.
Of course, from time to time we will have conspicuous signals of poor
quality auditing, such as Arthur Andersen's failures at Enron and WorldCom.
Seldom, however, will an audit failure be as obvious and well-publicized. 19
And to complicate matters, even a very public revelation of an audit failure can

send an ambiguous signal. Even when an audit client subsequently restates its
revenues or earnings, it will be hard to discern whether the auditor was
negligent or duped by a tightly-knit conspiracy of insiders. 20 The restatement

itself is ambiguous: does it reflect poor auditing in the past, or particularly
diligent auditing today? 2 1 Evaluating the quality of audit services ex post is a
difficult task, requiring highly-specialized expertise and access to an
accounting firm's work records. Short of a full-blown forensic audit (an

expensive proposition), insiders will be able to sneak some percentage of
deceptions past their auditors even when the auditors have adopted appropriate
procedures to check for fraud (i.e., the procedures that are cost-justified given
the likelihood of fraudulent misstatements by that client). We should not leap
from the fact of a misstated financial statement to the conclusion that the
auditors were asleep at the switch.
Indeed, one study comparing Arthur Andersen's performance relative to

its peers finds no significant differences. 22 And Deloitte & Touche, which
conducted the audit quality peer review of Arthur Andersen just prior to
Andersen's implosion, found that Andersen's systems were adequate to provide
23

reasonable assurance that its audits complied with professional standards.

Before Enron, there were cautionary flags, like the penalties imposed by the

19 It certainly was not obvious before those firms collapsed. See, e.g., Jeffrey N.
Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation:Some InitialReflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1233, 1236 (2002) ("it was known
and widely discussed in the analytic community that Enron's financial structure was highly
complex and that the bodies were buried in off-balance sheet entities that were described
cryptically in Enron's disclosure documents. No one on the outside really understood
Enron's financial condition, but they also knew they did not know. As on one analyst put it,
Enron was 'faith' stock.").
20 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 31 ("the serious issue is whether even
strong regulation will change auditors' practical ability to find corporate fraud when
determined corporate insiders want to hide it.").
21 James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of FinancialReporting: The PCAOB and the
Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 318 (2003) ("The [rise in]
restatements may well portend both a greater diligence on the part of the auditors as well as a
stiffening of their resolve.").
22 Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An
EmpiricalExamination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STuD. 263, 263 (2004).

23 Paul R. Chaney & Kirk L. Philipich, Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit
Failure,40 J. OF ACCT. RES. 1221, 1223 (2002) (discussing Deloitte & Touche report of its
peer review).
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SEC against the firm for its failures in auditing Waste Management, 24 but no
smoking guns. If anyone knew that Arthur Andersen's work
was deficient,
25
there was money to be made selling its client's shares short.
II. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND THE REGULATION OF AUDITORS
The difficulties that market participants may have in assessing audit
quality suggest that regulation could potentially play a useful role in providing
information to the market. As noted above, any convincing analysis of audit
quality will require specialized expertise and access to the auditor's work
papers. An expert in accounting with such access might provide a more precise
evaluation of the quality of an auditor's work than the muddy signal provided
by an audit failure. An audit firm with confidence in its procedures and
employees might be willing to commit itself to a review regime with sanctions,
if the review were conducted and the sanctions determined by an expert. Under
such a regime, audit firms would be confident that ex post sanctions would only
be imposed when the firm had done an inadequate job. And auditors would
presumably welcome ex ante advice on their audit methods if it helped them
avoid the damaging loss to reputation that follows from an audit failure. This
suggests that there may be a role for regulation, both in looking at the outcome
of a particular audit engagement in hindsight, and looking at an audit firm's
procedures more generally to determine if those procedures are likely to
produce a credible attestation of the reporting company's financial statement.
The regulation of public accountants has recently undergone a sea change
in the United States. We have gone from a predominantly self-regulatory
regime to quasi-governmental oversight accompanied by stringent regulation of
auditors and the auditor's relationships with its clients. This dramatic
regulatory shift has important consequences for the assessment of the marginal
value of litigation in promoting quality audits, a question I turn to in Part III. In
this part, I summarize the most important changes in auditor regulation brought
about by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the rules adopted pursuant to that law.
A.

The Self-Regulatory Regime

Until 1933, the contents of financial statements included in public
companies' prospectuses and annual reports were regulated only by some state
laws and stock exchanges' listing agreements. 26 The federal government played
no role in accounting or the regulation of accountants. Notwithstanding the
limited legal requirements, most corporations whose stock was publicly traded
27
their financial statements audited by independent public accountants.
had
With the adoption of the federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934, auditing of

24
25

26
27

In re Arthur Andersen LLP, 2001 SEC LEXIS 1174 (SEC June 19, 2001).
See Chaney & Philipich, supranote 23, at 1223.
Benston, supra note 17, at 1325.
Benston, supra note 17, at 1329.
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public companies in the United States was placed under the supervision of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission). 28
The SEC, however, has generally used that authority sparingly until
recently. Although the SEC briefly flirted in its early years with the creation of
uniform accounting principles under the leadership of Chairman William 0.
Douglas, it ultimately chose to delegate the formulation of generally accepted

accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards to the
accounting industry. 29 Financial statements filed with the SEC were required to
be prepared in accordance with principles having "substantial authoritative
support." 30 In practice, that meant delegation of the promulgation of accounting
principles and auditing standards to the accounting industry's trade association,
now known as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA).
The AICPA eventually delegated the promulgation of accounting
principles to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a part of the
non-profit Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF). 31 The FASB's principles
have been specifically endorsed by the SEC as providing "substantial
authoritative support. ' ,32 The FASB, until recently, has been funded by the
FAF, which receives most of its funding from the subscriptions and sales of
FASB publications and a smaller portion of its funding from voluntary
contributions. 33 The FASB has
34 a professional staff and a mandate to narrow the
available accounting choices.
The AICPA delegated the promulgation of auditing standards to what
eventually became the Auditing Standards Board. 35 The Auditing Standards
28 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000). The accounting authority now
held by the SEC was held briefly by the Federal Trade Commission until the SEC was
created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000) (creating SEC as an independent commission and vesting it with
authority previously held by the Federal Trade Commission under the Securities Act of
1933). The Exchange Act also authorizes the SEC to require audited financial statements in
public company's periodic filings. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) & §
78m(a)(2) (2000).
29 Joel Seligman, The SEC and Accounting: A HistoricalPerspective, 7 J. OF COMP.
Bus. & CAPITAL MARKET L. 241, 253-54 (1985).
30 Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, SEC Accounting Series Release No.
4 (Apr. 25, 1938) (advising that financial statements filed based on "accounting principles
for which there is no substantial authoritative support" would be presumed to be misleading).
31 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Facts About FASB, http://www.fasb.org/
facts/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
32 Statement of Policy of the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles
and Standards, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150, 39 Fed. Reg. 1260 (Jan. 7, 1974).
33 Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through
Improvement of the Auditing Process, Securities Act Release No. 33-809, 67 Fed. Reg.
44,964 n.92 (Jul. 5, 2002) (reporting that in 2001, the FAF received approximately $5
million in net contributions and yielded $12 million from the sales of FASB publications).
34 Benston, supra note 17, at 1334.
35 AICPA, The Enron Crisis: The AICPA, The Profession & The Public Interest: A
BriefHistory of Self-Regulation (Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.aicpa.org/info/regulation02.
htm.
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Board was originally overseen directly by the AICPA, but oversight was briefly
shifted in 2001 to the Public Oversight Board (POB), an independent entity that
was funded by the AICPA. 36 The POB was created in 1977 to administer a selfregulatory system for auditors, in part to head off the threat of government
regulation of the accounting industry.37 Atthe same time the AICPA created
the SEC Practice Section (SECPS), which all of its member firms auditing
public companies were required to join.38
Oversight of accounting firms took two forms under the AICPA's
guidance. Firms that joined the SECPS were required to adhere to its standards
and submit to periodic peer reviews. 39 Allegations of an audit failure in
litigation filed against a member of the SECPS were reviewed by Quality
Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC). The member firm was required to review
the performance of its senior personnel and report the matter to the QCIC. The
QCIC would then review the matter, and, if warranted, refer the engagement to
the AICPA Professional Ethics Division for possible investigation.
Self-regulation of the accounting industry increasingly came in for
criticism. In 2002, the SEC determined that a new regulatory structure was
needed for the auditing industry. It identified six weaknesses with selfregulation:
1. Peer reviews may not consistently be as thorough as necessary.
2. The disciplinary process is voluntary.
3. There is no independent and dependable funding source.
4. The disciplinary process relies solely on information gathered from
accountants.
5. Sanctions are weak.
41
6. The disciplinary proceedings are not public.
To be sure, some of these concerns were overstated. The SEC's first
concern was that the process of peer review was inadequate. Peer reviews were
intended to evaluate whether the firm being reviewed had systems in place to
meet the AICPA's Quality Control Standards and in fact complied with them,
as well as the SECPS's membership requirements. The SEC worried that firms
were receiving "clean" reviews in the peer-review process despite wellpublicized problems at the firm.4 2 The SEC provided no evidence, however,
that the peer-review process had failed in any systematic fashion, relying
instead on isolated anecdotes. More recent research finds that the peer review
36 Donna M. Nagy, PlayingPeekaboo with ConstitutionalLaw: The PCAOB and its

Public/PrivateStatus, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 975, 989-90 (2005).
37 Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through
Improvements of Oversight of the Auditing Process, Securities Act Release No. 8,109 [2002
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,706 (Jul. 26, 2002) (hereinafter Framework).
The POB disbanded in early 2002 after the SEC announced its intention to create a new
oversight body for the accounting profession. Nagy, supra note 36, at 995.
38 Framework,supra note 37, at Appendix A.
39 id.

40 Framework,supra note 37, at 85,904 n.30.
41 Framework,supra note 37, at 85,904-05.
42 Framework,supra note 37, at 85,906.
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process did have a significant influence
on the market for auditors, suggesting
43
that it did add to auditor credibility.
The second concern, that the disciplinary process was "voluntary,"
overstated the case considerably. The AICPA's disciplinary process was
voluntary in the sense that an accounting firm could resign its membership in
the SECPS, but it is hard to imagine a public company that would hire a firm
that was not a member of the SECPS. Doing so would surely invite careful
scrutiny by the SEC of that company's financial filings. The more substantial
concern was that the AICPA was "dominated by accounting firms"44 (hardly a
surprise for the accounting industry's trade association), and that accountants
would be tempted to go light on their peers.
The third concem, funding, was salient because of the SECPS's thenrecent threat to pull funding from the POB. The POB had drawn the wrath of
the accounting industry with its plan (encouraged by the SEC) to review the
accounting firms' independence. Independence is, of course, a fundamental
issue for "independent" public accountants. Given the elasticity in many
accounting principles, objectivity reinforces our confidence that those
principles are being applied fairly. More to the-point, independence was an
issue that had become a priority for the SEC in the late 1990s under the
chairmanship of Arthur Levitt.45 In hindsight, it seems clear that the accounting
firms overplayed their hand with their threat to withdraw funding from the
POB. This bullying greatly undermined the argument that the POB was
independent and could therefore be trusted to carry out the accounting
industry's self-regulatory responsibilities in the interest of investors. As Levitt
puts it "The lesson of this episode is crystal clear: self-regulation by the
accounting profession is a bad joke ... . ' The
firms would never subject
46
themselves to scrutiny unless forced to do so.
The fourth concern, that the AICPA lacked the power to obtain
information from third parties, is a common weakness of self-regulatory
organizations. Because their disciplinary power arises from a member firm's
consent to be disciplined, a self-regulator can coerce the consent of the member
to cooperate with an investigation by threatening expulsion, but the selfregulator has no comparable threat to wield against non-members. A complete
and thorough investigation, however, may require cooperation from third
parties, such as the clients of the member firms. But the clients may have good
reasons not to cooperate, such as litigation risk. A problem with an audit
suggests an underlying problem with the client corporation's accounting, and
the corporation faces substantially greater litigation exposure than the auditors.

43. Giles Hillary & Clive Lennox, The Credibility of Self-Regulation: Evidencefrom the
Accounting Profession s Peer Review Program, 40 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 211, 213 (2005)
(finding that audit firms receiving "clean" peer reviews had a net increase in the number of
clients of 3.5%, while audit firms with adverse opinions lost 6.8%).
44 Framework,supra note 37, at 85,905.
45 Nagy, supra note 36, at 994-95.
46 ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 127

(2002).
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The SEC's fifth concern, that sanctions were weak, flips the problem on its
head. The SEC worried that "[t]he most stringent sanction in an AICPA
proceeding is expulsion from the AICPA, which does not directly affect an
accountant's ability to practice before the Commission or elsewhere. ' '47 But this
was hardly the fault of the AICPA-the SEC had the power to exclude firms
from practicing before it if they had been expelled; 48 it was up to the SEC to
use that power. The bigger concern is that the AICPA's sanctions were too
severe-expulsion from the AICPA meant a death knell to a firm's business
auditing public companies because expulsion would prod the SEC into taking
action to bar the accountant. Because the sanction was so severe, the AICPA
was understandably reluctant to use it. A study by the Washington Post found
that the AICPA disciplined accountants who had been found to have engaged in
professional misconduct by the SEC only 20% of the time.49 What was needed
was a broader range of intermediate sanctions, such as fines, to give the
regulator some flexibility in meting out punishment short of a "death penalty,"
but still carrying some deterrent teeth.
The sixth concern, the lack of public disciplinary proceedings, is an
important one. As noted in Part I, the loss of reputation is an important
deterrent against both negligence and affirmative wrongdoing, particularly in a
business like accounting, in which firms are effectively "renting" their
reputations to their clients. A public censure from the accounting regulators
would seriously compromise an audit firm's reputation and therefore serve as
an important deterrent.
These concerns came to a head in 2002 in the wake of a number of highprofile accounting scandals, highlighted by the Enron meltdown. The number
of accounting problems relative to the number of U.S. public companies was
small to be sure, but the prominence of the Enron fiasco suggested to at least
some observers that U.S. public companies had a pervasive audit failure
problem. Even members of the accounting profession were calling for a
revamping of the regulatory structure. 50 With Congress clamoring for action,
the SEC decided to finally exercise the authority over accounting that Congress
had given it nearly seventy years earlier. The SEC proposed the creation of a

47 Framework,supra note 37, at 85,905.
48 SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1) (2003).
49 David S. Hilzenrath, Auditors Face Scant Discipline: Review Process Lacks
Resources, Coordination, Will, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2001, at Al.
50 James Turley, Chairman of Ernst & Young LLP, called for:
a new regulatory body for the profession. It should have its own funding, offices and
staff. It should have direct power over the profession's disciplinary and audit quality
control programs, replacing the current 'peer review' process in which firms review
each other. To ensure maximum public credibility, this oversight should come from a
body other than the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, because many
believe it has not maintained its historic focus on professional responsibility.
James S. Turley, How Accounting Can Get Back Its Good Name, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2002,

at A16 (quoted in SEC, Framework, supra note 37, at 85,907).
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"Public Accountability Board" (PAB), which accounting
firms would be
51
required to join if they wanted to audit public companies.
The SEC's proposed PAB was swept aside, however, with the implosion
of WorldCom amidst a particularly bald-faced accounting fraud. Congress
rushed to get tough on accountants with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; legislators
were delighted to give the SEC all the tools the agency needed to get the job
done. The criticisms leveled at the prior self-regulatory regime, with minor
exception, cannot be fairly charged against the new regulatory order for
accountants.
B.

The PCAOB

The most important tool given to the SEC was the PCAOB. The PCAOB
is charged with "protect[ing] the interests of investors and further[ing] the
public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent
audit reports" for public companies. 2 To achieve these goals, Congress gave
the PCAOB comprehensive authority over the accounting industry (at least the
portion of that industry that audits public companies).
The disciplinary process is no longer voluntary. Accounting firms auditing
public companies are all required to register with the PCAOB.53 Once
registered, the accounting firms are subject to the auditing, quality control, and
ethics standards adopted by the PCAOB.54 To ensure that registered firms are
following its standards, the PCAOB is charged with conducting periodic
inspections of registered accounting firms. 55 The Board is also empowered to
investigate possible violations by registered accounting firms of the SarbanesOxley Act, the securities laws, and the PCAOB's own rules. So the PCAOB
now exercises both the authority to set auditing standards and the disciplinary
power previously held by the AICPA and the POB. There can be little question
that the PCAOB's scope of regulatory authority is adequate to the task set for it
by Congress.
Congress not only gave the PCAOB broad authority, it stipulated detailed
requirements for the new accounting regulator. Although Congress specifically
stated that the PCAOB would not be a government agency, 57 the PCAOB
operates under the close oversight of the SEC. Rather than relying on the
implicit authority over accountants conferred by the SEC's authority over the
financial statements of public companies, Congress followed the existing
statutory framework for the self-regulatory organizations (SROs), making it
explicit that the PCAOB would be subject to the SEC's direction and control.
That direction and control, however, is substantially more intrusive than the
51 Framework,supra note 37.

52
53
54
55
56
57

Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley

Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. 2001-2003).
Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 7212 (Supp. 2001-2003).
Act § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7213 (Supp. 2001-2003).
Act § 104(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(a) (Supp. 2001-2003).
Act § 105(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(1) (Supp. 2001-2003).
Act § 101(a) & (b), 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (a) & (b) (Supp. 2001-2003).
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authority that the SEC exercises over the SROs. To start, unlike the SROs, all
five of the PCAOB board members are selected by the SEC. 58 The influence of
the accounting profession over the PCAOB is limited by the stricture that
"[t]wo members, and only 2 members, of the Board shall be or have been
certified public accountants . .

.59

In addition to appointing the PCAOB's members, the SEC has extensive
oversight authority over the Board analogous to that exercised by the
Commission over the SROs. 60 The PCAOB is required to make an annual
report of its activities to the SEC and to Congress. The SEC must approve all
rules proposed by the PCAOB.62 More intrusively, the SEC can amend any
PCAOB rule.63 The SEC's oversight authority extends to review of disciplinary
actions taken by the Board, either at the behest of an aggrieved4party (e.g., an
accounting firm or an accountant) or on the SEC's own motion. The SEC can
not only overturn disciplinary proceedings if they are not conducted in
accordance with law, it can also review the sanctions imposed by the Board and
reduce, modify, or increase the sanction. 65 Moreover, the SEC can censure the
Board itself, or rescind its authority, if the SEC is not satisfied with how the
Board does its job. 6666 The bottom line is that if the SEC believes that the
PCAOB is not regulating in a sufficiently vigorous fashion, the SEC has all the
power it needs to correct that deficiency, despite the PCAOB's nominal status
as a "private" entity.
The PCAOB's independence from the accounting industry is further
bolstered by its funding sources. The first source is annual fees to be paid by
each registered public accounting firm, "in amounts that are sufficient to
recover the costs of processing and reviewing applications and annual
reports." 67 The second, and considerably more substantial, source is "annual
accounting suport fees" to be paid by public companies based on their market
capitalization. Once each year, the Board will compute the fees based on the
Board's budget for that year, less the sum of all registration fees and annual
fees received during the preceding calendar year from public accounting firms,

58 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(1) & (4), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(1) & (4) (Supp.
2001-2003). Board members serve staggered five-year terms, but they are subject to
removal by the SEC "for good cause shown." Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. §
7211 (e)(5) & (6) (Supp. 2001-2003).
59 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 721 1(e)(2) (Supp. 2001-2003). If the
chairperson is a CPA, he or she must not have practiced as an accountant for at least five
years before appointment to the PCAOB. Id.
60 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 107(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(a) (Supp. 2001-2003).
61 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(h), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(h) (Supp. 2001-2003).
62 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 107(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(2) (Supp. 2001-2003).
63 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 107(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(5) (Supp. 2001-2003).
64
65
66
67
68

Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley
Sarbanes-Oxley

Act §
Act §
Act §
Act §
Act §

107(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(c)(2) (Supp. 2001-2003).
107(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(c)(3) (Supp. 2001-2003).
107(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d) (Supp. 2001-2003).
102(f), 15 U.S.C. § 7212(f) (Supp. 2001-2003).
109, 15 U.S.C. § 7219 (Supp. 2001-2003).
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as approved by the SEC. 69 Under this formula, the overwhelming share of the
cost of regulating accountants is paid by public companies, rather than
accountants who paid the cost of the prior self-regulatory regime. 70 The
PCAOB clearly enjoys the independent and dependable funding source that the
self-regulatory POB lacked.
In sum, there can be no doubts about the PCAOB's independence from the
accounting industry. The new accounting regulator is squarely under the thumb
of the SEC's oversight and control. Better yet, from the perspective of vigorous
regulation, the PCAOB's funding has been guaranteed by Congress for the
foreseeable future.
Nor can there be any substantial doubt about the thoroughness of the
PCAOB's inspection of registered auditing firms. The PCAOB inspects firms
annually providing they audit more than 100 issuers on a yearly basis. Firms
providing audit reports to 100 or less issuers are inspected at least every three
years. The Board is required to "inspect and review selected audit and review
engagements" and "evaluate the sufficiency of the quality control system of the
firm., 71 These on-site inspections of registered accounting firms are performed
by accountants with public company auditing experience. An inspection must
at minimum include an inspection and review of selected audit and review
engagements of the firm, performed at various offices and by various
associated persons of the firm: an evaluation of the sufficiency of the quality
control system of the firm and the manner of the documentation and
communication of that system by the firm. In addition, the performance of audit
testing, supervisory, and quality control
procedures of the firm are also
73
assessed as necessary or appropriate.
The PCAOB's inspection process is backed up by broad-ranging
enforcement authority. The Board is empowered to investigate possible
violations by registered accounting firms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
securities laws, and the PCAOB's own rules. 74 In conducting its investigations,
the PCAOB can compel registered firms and persons associated with those
firms to testify and produce documents, including audit work papers.75 The
rules also permit the Board to seek information from other persons, including
clients of registered firms..7 6 In addition, the PCAOB can also call on the SEC
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 109(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b) (Supp. 2001-2003).
70 For 2005, the Board adopted a $137.1 million budget. Of this amount, $136.1 million
69

was raised from accounting support fees. PCAOB, Board Approves Revised 2005 Budget
(Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.pcaobus.org/newsand-events/news/2004/12-30.aspx.
71 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(d) (Supp. 2001-2003).
72 The PCAOB expects to have a staff of 450 by the end of 2005, with its current hiring
focused on experienced auditors who will conduct the Board's program of inspections.
PCAOB 2005 Budget (Revised) (March 3, 2005), http://www.pcaob.org/about thepcaob/
budget__presentations/2005.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
73 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(d) (Supp. 2001-2003).
74 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(1) (Supp. 2001-2003).
75 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(2)(A) & (B), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(b)(2)(A) & (B) (Supp.
2001-2003).

76Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 2001-2003).
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to exercise its wide-ranging subpoena authority to compel others to testify and
produce documents." The PCAOB should therefore have78 access to all the
information that it needs to conduct thorough investigations.
According to the PCAOB rules, if the Board determines that there was a
potential malfeasance on the part of the participating audit firm, it is to inform
the SEC and the appropriate state regulatory authority. The Board is also
entitled to investigate. 79 If the Board concludes that there has been a violation,
it is empowered to impose a wide range of money sanctions, as well as practice
limitations.8" Thus, the PCAOB has considerable discretion to ensure that the
sanction imposed is appropriate to the violation. If the sanctions meted out by
the PCAOB
are inadequate, it will be for lack of will, not lack of statutory
81
authority.
82
Congress also directed the PCAOB to establish quality control standards
and ethics standards to be used by registered public accounting firms in the
preparation and issuance of audit reports. 83 Currently, public accounting firms

77 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(2)(D) (Supp. 2001-2003).
78 Firms that refuse to cooperate in the Board's investigation can have their registration
suspended or revoked. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(3)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(3)(A)(ii)
(Supp. 2001-2003). Persons associated with the registered accounting firms can be
suspended or barred from associating with the firm; the firm can be required to fire a person
who does not cooperate. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(3)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(3)(A)(i)
(Supp. 2001-2003). Lesser sanctions are also available for non-cooperation. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act § 105(b)(3)(A)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(3)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2001-2003). The Board
recently exercised its authority to sanction firms that fail to cooperate for the first time,
revoking the registration of a public accounting firm and barring its managing partner for
having falsified documents in an audit file in an effort to conceal a violation of the
independence rules. PCAOB, Board Revokes Firm's Registration, Disciplines Three
Accountantsfor Failureto Cooperate(May 24, 2005), http://www.pcaobus.org/Newsand
_Events/News/2005/05-24.aspx.
'9 PCAOB Rule 4004, RULES OF THE BOARD (Feb. 15, 2005), http://www.pcaobus.org
/Rules/Rules of the Board/Section_4.pdf.
80 Sanctions include:
(1) money penalties of up to $100,000 for associated persons and $2 million for firms;
(2) censure;
(3) required education or training; and
(4) other penalties provided for in the Board's rules.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4) (Supp. 2001-2003).
More stringent penalties can be imposed for intentional or knowing misconduct or repeated
negligence:
(1) temporary or permanent suspensions of registration of firms or bars of their
associated persons;
(2) limits on the operations and activities of the firm and its associated persons; and
(3) money penalties of up to $750,000 for associated persons and $15 million for firms.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(c)(4) &(5), 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4) &(5) (Supp. 2001-2003).
81 So far, the PCAOB has only sanctioned one firm, and that was for obstructing its
inspection. PCAOB, supra note 78.
82 A skeleton of the standards is provided by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act § 103(a)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 2001-2003).
83 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a) (Supp. 2001-2003). These rules
are required to include seven year retention of work papers, peer review of audits, disclosure
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involved in the preparation or issuance of audit reports are to follow the ethics
standards and independence standards as set out in the AICPA's Code of
Professional Conduct to the extent that those standards have not been
superseded or amended by PCAOB rules. The PCAOB adopted the AICPA's
standards as its own on an interim basis, 84 but going forward the responsibility
for revising those standards lies with the PCAOB. The PCAOB has taken I
the task, issuing standards on audits of internal controls, audit documentation,
and the evaluation of efforts to correct weaknesses in internal controls. 87 So the
early evidence would certainly not cause any concern that the PCAOB will be
lax in adopting rules for the industry.
C. New Regulations ofA uditors

1. Independence

Congress was not satisfied to delegate the regulation of auditors to the
PCAOB; it also adopted a number of specific restrictions on auditors' practice.
Congress came down firmly on the side of a stringent definition of auditor
independence when it enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Congress worried that
the lure of lucrative contracts for other services created strong incentives for
auditors to knuckle under to management pressure, thereby compromising the
integrity of the audit.88 Consequently, auditors are now banned from providing
a broad array of services to their audit clients, including: bookkeeping,
designing financial systems, appraisal and valuation services, actuarial services,
internal auditing functions, management and human resources services,
investment services, and legal services. 89 The PCAOB is authorized to ban the
provision of other services as well. 90
of auditors' testing of issuers internal controls, monitoring of ethics and independence,
consultation within auditing firms, supervision, hiring, acceptance of engagements and
internal inspection. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a)(1) & (2), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) & (2)
(Supp.2001-2003).
14 PCAOB Rules 3200T, 330T, 3400T, & 3500T, RULES OF THE BOARD (Feb. 15,

2005), http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules of the Board/Section_3.pdf.
85 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2001-2003).
86 PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 3, AUDITING AND RELATED PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
STANDARDS (June 9, 2004), http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules-of theBoard/Auditing_

Standard_3.pdf.
87 PCAOB Adopted Standard Regarding Reporting on Whether a Previously Reported
Material Weakness Continues to Exist (Jul. 26, 2005), http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket
018/2005-07-26 Release 2005-015.pdf.
88 For evidence in support of that view, see Richard Frankel et al., The Relation
Between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Management, 77 THE ACCT.

REv. 71 (Supp. 2002).
89 Securities Exchange Act § 10A(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g) (2000). Not all non-audit,
consulting services are banned. Auditors may still provide, among other things, tax planning
advice to their clients so long as they obtain prior approval from the audit committee.
Securities Exchange Act § 10A(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(h) (2000).
90 Securities Exchange Act § 10A(g)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g)(9) (2000). The PCAOB
recently took advantage of this authority to ban auditors from offering tax advice (1) on a
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Congress adopted additional rules to bolster independence. Too familiar a
relationship between the partner and company executives can compromise
independence. So audit firms are now required to rotate the partner in charge of
the audit for each client at least once every five years. 91 In the same vein,
section 10A(l) of the Exchange Act now bans audit firms from auditing
companies whose CEOs, CFOs, or controllers were employed by the audit firm
and that
employee participated in the audit of the company during the prior
92
year.

2. New Dutiesfor Auditors
In addition to the new independence requirements discussed above,
Congress also imposed new responsibilities on auditors. Auditors must adopt
procedures to detect "illegal acts that would have a direct and material effect"
on financial statements and identify material related party transactions, 93 a
responsibility that auditors have long resisted out of fear that it would create
additional fodder for litigation. This duty was added to existing responsibilities
to report illegal acts to management and the audit committee or entire board of
directors. 94 A board of directors receiving such a report must notify the SEC; if
it fails to do so, the audit firm must provide notice to the SEC itself. The
political compromise extracted by the auditing profession is that reports by
auditors95 of illegal acts to the SEC cannot be the basis for liability in any private
action.

The auditor's duties include not only the ex post detection of fraud, they
are also charged with evaluating the procedures that the company has in place
to prevent fraud. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the
company's managers to include a statement in the company's annual report on
the manager's responsibility for the company's internal controls for financial
reporting and provide an assessment of those controls.96 Section 404 also
requires that "each registered public accounting firm that prepares or issues the
contingent basis; (2) that is deemed to be an "aggressive interpretation" of the tax laws; or
(3) to management members who serve in financial reporting oversight roles. PCAOB Rules
3521-23 (Proposed Official Draft 2005). The concern is that acting in the role of tax advisor,
in which the goal is to minimize the client's tax liability, may undermine the objectivity
required to an independent audit. In that role, the auditor in not supposed to sign on to the
company's goal of maximizing its reported profits. The auditor's role is to ensure that the
report is accurate, not maximized. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the
Management and Controlof the Modern Business Corporation:Some Initial Reflections, 69

U. CHI. L. REv. 1233, 1238 (2002). ("[T]his tax planning approach all too readily carries
over to 'accounting planning,' in which the accountant aggressively construes accounting
rules to maximize reported income irrespective of less illuminating disclosure to the ultimate
client, the shareholders.").
91 Securities Exchange Act § 1OA(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2000).
92 Securities Exchange Act § 10A(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(1) (2000).
93 Securities Exchange Act § 1OA(a)(1) & (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)(1) & (2). Auditors
are also required to evaluate the ability of the client to continue as a going concern through
its next fiscal year. Securities Exchange Act § 10A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)(3).
94 Securities Exchange Act § 10A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b) (2000).
95 Securities Exchange Act § 10A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(c) (2000).
96 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (Supp. 2001-2003).
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audit report for the issuer" shall attest to the management's assessment of the
firm's system of internal controls for financial reporting. 97 Auditors are now
required to not only certify the integrity of their client's financial statements,
but also assess the mechanisms that their corporate clients have adopted to
generate the financial information that goes into those statements. One worries
that assessment will be tinged by self-interest; the more extensive the
company's internal controls, the more confidence the auditor can have in the
numbers generated. As suggested by the quote from William McDonough in
the introduction, self-interest will be reinforced by liability concerns, as the
auditor's attestation of its client's internal controls will expose the auditor to
securities fraud class actions if those internal controls later prove to be
insufficient. 98 Being more demanding in assessing internal controls reduces the
auditor's litigation exposure. The cost of those controls, of course, comes out of
the client's pocket.
D. CorporateReforms
1.

Accuracy Requirementsfor Managers

In addition to reforming the regulation of auditors, Congress increased the
pressure on company managers to provide accurate financial statements. A
somewhat draconian provision added by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, section 304 is
intended to make officers think hard about the accuracy of company's financial
statements. That section requires CEOs and CFOs to return bonus and other
incentive compensation to the company for any period that the company is
required to restate its financial results as a result of "misconduct."
"Misconduct" is not defined, nor is it limited to misconduct by the CEO and
CFO.
Officers and directors of the issuer are prohibited from misleading the
auditor in connection with any filing to be made with the SEC. 99 More
intrusively, section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (as implemented in Rules
13a-14(a) and 15d-14(a) of the Exchange Act) requires that the CEO and CFO
100
personally certify the accuracy of the periodic reports filed with the SEC.
97 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (Supp. 2001-2003).
98 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing's New Early Warning System:

Control Disclosure,Auditor Liability, and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGs L.J. 1449, 1475-76
(2004). ("Auditors must describe material weaknesses, their actual and potential effects on
financial statements and related control objectives, and their effects on the auditor's financial
statement audit. When these disclosures are false or misleading, the speaker becomes a
primary actor under any of the various formulations interpreting Central Bank" and likely
within "Section lOb's reach").
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2003).
100 Specifically, CEOs and CFOs must certify that:
* They have reviewed the report;
* Based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain material misstatements
or omissions;
* Based on the officer's knowledge, the financial statements 'fairly present in all
material respects" the issuer's results and financial condition;
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This certification of financial statements is backed up by a parallel criminal
provision. 101
These certification requirements do two things. First, they focus the CEO
and the CFO on the need for accuracy in reporting. These officers are unlikely
to skimp on resources for financial reporting (paid for by the shareholders) if
they have to sign off on the results, particularly if they risk jail time for a false
certification. That instinct is reinforced by the provision requiring the CEO and
CFO to return incentive compensation earned during a period for which the
company was forced to restate its financial statements. This provides a
powerful incentive to get the numbers right. Second, the certification provisions
reduce the ability of the CEO and CFO to claim ignorance of misstatements or
omissions in the periodic reports. Furthermore, if they certify that the report
contains no misstatements or omissions, they have made an additional
misstatement with the certification. As a result, the certification requirement
may make it difficult for the CEO and CFO to evade personal liability in a
private antifraud action. The bottom line for the auditors is that they can have
more confidence in the numbers that they are being asked to review.
2. CorporateGovernance Reforms
Congress also adopted a number of significant changes to the corporate
governance of public companies as part of the effort to clean up auditing. The
retention, compensation and oversight of the company's external auditor now
must be entrusted to an independent audit committee of the board of
directors. 102 The audit committee also has the authority to hire its own advisors
" They are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal control and have:
o
Designed those controls so that material information is made known to
them,
o
Evaluated the effectiveness of those controls within 90 days of the
report, and
o
Presented the conclusion of their evaluation in the report;
" They have disclosed to the company's auditors and audit committee any weaknesses
in those internal controls and any fraud by persons who have a significant role in the
issuer's internal controls;
" Any changes to internal controls made subsequent to the evaluation are disclosed in
the report.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. 2001-2003) (emphasis added).
101 Under the criminal provision, CEOs and CFOs that "the periodic report containing
the financial statements fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act ... and that information contained in the periodic report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
issuer." Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. 2001-2003). Violators of this
provision "knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport
with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." More serious sanctions of a $5,000,000 fine
and/or 20 years in prison are available for a defendant who "willfully certifies any
statement.., knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport
with all the requirements set forth in this section." Id.
102 Securities Exchange Act § 1OA(m)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(2) (2000). The audit
committee must be made up exclusively of independent directors (meaning that the only
compensation the director can receive from the company is the director's fee-no consulting
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03
(typically legal counsel) at the company's expense.' The auditors must report
to the audit committee "critical accounting policies and practices," alternative
treatments of financial information discussed with management, and any other
"material written communications" between the auditor and management.
The audit committee is also responsible for approving any non-audit
services (now strictly limited, as discussed above) provided by the company's
auditor. 10 4 Finally, the audit committee is charged with establishing procedures
In sum,
for dealing with complaints relating to auditing and internal controls.
the relationship between the auditors and their client is now firmly the
responsibility of independent directors, who presumably are more concerned
with the maintenance of their reputation than ensuring that the numbers are
06
sufficient to keep their stock options in the money.

E.

Summary

So where do we stand now with the regulation of accountants? In a
nutshell, Congress executed a complete governmental takeover of the
regulation of auditors with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Accountants are being held on a very tight leash by government regulators. The
criticisms leveled at the prior self-regulatory regime have largely been
addressed.
On the other side of the audit relationship, companies are spending a lot
more to ensure the integrity of their financial statements. The hastily drawn
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a strong signal of reform, but it has proved to be quite
or other employment arrangements are permitted). Securities Exchange Act § 1OA(m)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3) (2000). The SEC has bolstered this independence requirement with a
disclosure requirement relating to the expertise of the audit committee. The SEC now
requires the company to disclose whether any member of the audit committee qualifies as a
"financial expert," which requires either experience as an accountant or an accounting
officer, or experience supervising an accounting officer or overseeing public accountants.
Regulation S-K Item 309. Listing requirements for the NYSE and Nasdaq require financial
literacy for all audit committee members. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.07;
Nasdaq Independence Rule Provisions, Rule 4350(d)(2). Both the NYSE and Nasdaq also
require that a majority of the board of directors of listed companies meet their respective
independence standards. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.01; Nasdaq Independence
Rule Provisions, Rule 4350(c)(1).
103 Securities Exchange Act § 10A(m)(5) & (6), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(5) & (6) (2000).
104 Securities Exchange Act § 10A(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(h) (2000).
105 Securities Exchange Act § 10A(m)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4) (2000).
"Whistleblowers" who make such complaints are protected from retaliation by both civil and
criminal sanctions against those who retaliate. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806, 18 U.S.C. §
1514A (Supp. 2001-2003).
106 The result of all the new requirements and restrictions imposed on audit committees
has been a substantial spike in the fees paid to outside directors of public companies in the
U.S. According to a survey by Mercer Human Resource Consulting, the median
compensation at the 350 largest U.S. public companies went from $105,000 in 2000 to
$155,000 in 2004. David Rovella, Directors' Compensationat Largest U.S. Companies Rose
in 2004, BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Aug. 29, 2005) (reporting on results of Mercer survey). The
increase was attributed to sharp increase in demands imposed on directors under the new
regulatory regime. Id.
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expensive for public companies in the U.S., not to mention quite lucrative for
the auditing profession. Moreover, the regulatory burden imposed by SarbanesOxley has fallen disproportionately on the smallest issuers, creating the risk
that some of these firms will "go dark," removing their securities from public
trading and that other firms will remain closely-held rather than pursuing
growth through an initial public offering. These costs, however, do not raise
any questions about the quality of auditing. They just mean that investors in the
U.S. capital markets will have fewer choices.
For larger issuers, however, the reforms adopted by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act have created a more adversarial relationship between company
management and independent auditors. Outside auditors are no longer seen by
company managers as trusted business advisors. Instead, they are seen as
agents of the state. The growth of auditors' fees in the last few years no doubt
helps fuel this resentment. A survey of 147 public companies conducted by the
law firm Foley & Lardner found increasing resentment toward outside
accountants. One (anonymous) quote from a survey participant: "[I]t has
created an adverse relationship with the auditors. They are no longer an advisor
the company can count on during the normal course of business. Public
company auditors are now privatized regulators for the SEC., 10 7 This may be a
necessary cost to ensure the goal of auditor independence, but it clearly must be
counted as a cost. An adversarial relationship between the monitors and those
that they monitor does not encourage those being monitored to be forthcoming
with information.' Has this more adversarial relationship made auditors more
objective, or has it unduly chilled information flows between the auditors and
management?
The burden that this plethora of new regulation imposes on auditors and
public companies raises substantial questions about the cost of trading as a
public company and raising capital in the U.S. It is too soon to tell whether this
cost will yield corresponding benefits in bolstering the integrity of the capital
markets. At this point, all we can say about the weighing of costs and benefits
is that Congress has embarked on a very expensive regulatory experiment. The
tallying of the benefits must await further experience under the new regulatory
regime.
. We can say with reasonable confidence, however, that the new regulatory
efforts work in tandem with the role of reputation and market forces to promote
audit quality. The worst that can be said about the most important of the
changes is that they curtail, at the bottom end, the available range of audit
quality. This implicit cartelization has to be considered a cost in terms of
efficiency-Does every company need gold-plated internal controls?-but it is
a cost that Congress was willing to impose on investors in the name of restoring
their confidence.
The good news is that inspections conducted by the PCAOB should
enhance the reputational market for auditors by bringing additional
Thomas E.Hartman, The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley (June
16, 2005) (Foley & Lardner LLP).
107

.08

Ribstein, supra note 20, at 3.
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transparency on the subject of audit quality. Moreover, the PCAOB has a
valuable role to play in facilitating the exchange of information concerning the
state of the art in auditing procedures. More stringent definitions of auditor
independence are likely to encourage objectivity in the application of GAAP.
And given the PCAOB's expertise in the field of accounting (and lack of
conflicting interests), the sanctions it imposes on audit firms and their
associated persons are likely to be inflicted with reasonable accuracy. It seems
safe to predict that being sanctioned by the PCAOB will send an unambiguous
signal the market, with a correspondingly significant effect on an audit firm's
reputational capital.
The same can be said of the certification requirements and corporate
governance changes adopted by Congress. Auditors can have greater
confidence in the integrity of the information that they will be reviewing, which
should allow them to do their job better. And placing the audit relationship
squarely under the direction of an independent audit committee should diminish
pressures on auditors to acquiesce in questionable accounting treatments.
All of these changes enhance the efficiency of the reputation market
outlined in Part I. The question that remains is how well the costly regulatory
experiment of Sarbanes-Oxley fits in with the third leg of the audit quality
triad-the risk of securities fraud class action litigation. I turn to that question
in Part III.
III. SUING AUDITORS
Private civil liability, particularly securities fraud class actions, promises
to provide deterrence above and beyond that already provided by the threat of
enforcement action from the SEC.' 09 Of course, the marginal deterrence
provided by securities fraud class actions has presumably been diminished by
the possibility of enforcement from the PCAOB. The creation of the PCAOBeffectively a junior varsity SEC-leverages the SEC's enforcement efforts.
Moreover, the PCAOB's enforcement efforts are supported by a guaranteed
stream of revenues to support the effort. This shift has presumably taken us
farther along the curve toward (past?) the optimal level of government
enforcement. Given the accuracy advantages of relatively disinterested and
expert PCAOB and SEC enforcement, the private enforcement of securities
109 In this regard, it is well to remember that auditing firms also remain under the

chilling threat of criminal liability, although it may have diminished somewhat. KPMG
recently avoided a fate akin to Arthur Andersen's for having offered bad advice on tax
shelters by throwing itself at the mercy of the Justice Department. Jonathan Weil, KPMG's
Settlement Provides for New Start; Agreement with US. Prosecutors Avoids Criminal
Indictment; Civil, Class-Action Suits Remain, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2005, at Cl. Given the
damage to competition that resulted from the reduction of the Big Five to the Big Four (and
the embarrassment of having Arthur Andersen's conviction reversed), an indictment of
KPMG was probably never the likely outcome. At this point, the Justice Department
probably will not brandish the threat of indicting any of the remaining Big Four without very
persuasive evidence of corruption at the firm level. Individual partners, however, are
unlikely to receive such kid glove treatment, as a number of KPMG's partners learned.
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fraud class actions can only be justified if it provides marginal deterrence at an
acceptable cost. Among the costs that must be considered is the effect that
securities fraud class actions have on other enforcement mechanisms and
regulatory tools.
The efficacy of litigation as an incentive for quality audits is also open to
serious question. At the most fundamental level, auditors are not (usually) the
bad guys-they are on the hook for the malfeasance of their clients, not their
own. Auditors do not get rich from fraud; at best, they preserve a steady
paycheck from the audit client. So the incentives to turn a blind eye to client
fraud are muted at best. Corporate managers may take seemingly unreasonable
risks in the hope of getting rich quick, but auditors cannot expect a similar
payday.
There is also reason to doubt whether the threat of litigation has the
deterrent force that it once did. When accountants were largely self-regulated
and operating in the partnership form, the deterrent stick of litigation may well
have been a necessary and useful tool for encouraging thorough audits.
Inadequate self-regulation potentially could be ameliorated by the additional
deterrence afforded by securities fraud class actions. Audit partners would do a
more thorough job and, perhaps more importantly, their co-partners would
monitor their work more closely if their personal fortunes were on the line. The
structure of accounting partnerships has changed, however, as the firms have
shifted to the LLP form and the incentive for the partners to monitor each other
has eased. The threat of liability for the firm is less of a stick when it will not
extend to the partners' personal assets. Collective action problems mean that no
individual partner will have a strong incentive to monitor his fellow partners. In
this environment, the threat of litigation from audit failure may add little
beyond the threat to the firm's reputation. My focus here, however, is on three
potential costs raised by using litigation as a deterrent: (1) the limits of the
litigation sorting process; (2) the limited effect that litigation exposure is likely
to have on auditor behavior; and (3) the effect that litigation exposure has on
regulatory approaches to promoting audit quality.
A.

Limits ofLitigation as a Sorting Process

Litigation leaves much to be desired as a means of promoting audit
quality. The most obvious concern is the precision with which lawsuits sanction
audit firms for their derelictions. The messiness of the signal conveyed by an
audit failure means that the hit to an auditor's reputation from a problem at a
client company will be muffled at worst. The litigation response to an audit
failure will not be so restrained. Publicity regarding accounting problems
creates a high likelihood of lawsuit against the auditor, particularly if the
misstated financials involve earnings or revenues.
For the external observer, lacking access to work papers and other relevant
evidence, it is easy to confuse the effects of fraud with the effects of an
innocent mistake or a risky business decision that did not pan out. Enron's
implosion is tied, in the public mind, to the accounting problems to which
Arthur Andersen turned a blind eye. Enron was likely to fail, however, whether
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or not it cooked the books, because the risky business decisions that it had
made did not pan out. If there is a sufficient stock price drop to generate the
necessary damages, a restatement or other accounting problem is likely to lead
to a lawsuit against the auditors, particularly if the corporation, an easier target,
has gone bankrupt."1 0 The cost of defending the lawsuit is the first sanction
imposed by the litigation process, and it is a sanction that may be only
tenuously related to how well the auditing firm has performed its job. The
lawsuits, like the rain, fall on the good and bad auditors alike after a client's
financials need to be restated. Many such complaints will be dismissed, 1 ' but
only after a significant cost in lawyers' fees and distraction.
Those costs will rise as the process moves beyond the complaint stage, but
confidence in the sorting ability of lawsuits increases only marginally. To be
sure, the plaintiffs' lawyers will gain access to the auditor's work papers if their
complaint survives the motion to dismiss, but that access to additional
information is not an unalloyed good for the accuracy of the litigation sorting
process. The sheer burden imposed by the discovery process-a task made
worse by Sarbanes-Oxley requirements mandating the retention of work papers
for seven years after the audit 112-creates a powerful incentive for settlement,
whatever the merits of the case.
The final stage of the litigation sorting process further pushes audit firms
toward settlement. Trials are virtually unheard of in this area. A number of
cognitive biases fuel the fear of trying a case to a judgment. The great fear
posed by going to trial is the hindsight bias-the tendency to place excessive
weight on events that actually did occur in the past (relative to events that
might have occurred but did not) in predicting the probability of events.' 13 The
auditors "must have known" of the fraud when it was being committed-at
least when the question is viewed in light of the subsequently revealed
evidence. For auditors, the central concern is that the established fact of an

110 Ross D. Fuerman, Naming Auditor Defendants in Securities Class Actions, 7 J.
LEGAL ECON. 72 (1997).

...Cf A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud?An EmpiricalStudy of
Motions to Dismiss Under the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL. LEG.
STUD. 125 (2005) (reporting results of study of motions to dismiss securities fraud
complaints).
112 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7213 (Supp. 2001-2003).
113 See generally Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of
Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975). See also Baruch Fischhoff, For Those

Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT AND
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos

Tversky eds., 1982) (quoted in Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 572 (1998)) ("In hindsight, people consistently
exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what
has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as having appeared 'relatively
inevitable' before it happened. People believe that others should have been able to anticipate
events much better than was actually the case."); Mitu Gulati et al., Fraudby Hindsight, 98
Nw. U. L. REV. 773, 773-74 (2004) (discussing the effect of the hindsight bias in the
securities litigation context).
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audit failure (hence the litigation), will be construed as persuasive evidence of
high engagement risk at the time of the engagement which called for more
extensive procedures. Audit failure becomes equated with audit laxity.
But most business reversals are just business reversals. The overall rate of
fraud by corporations is very low, and the percentage of those frauds in which
the auditors participate is lower still.

14

The temptation-when faced by the

salient evidence of huge losses that typically prompt securities fraud suits-is
to ignore this very low base rate in assessing whether there has been fraud." 15 If
the operative working hypothesis is that the audit failure was caused by the
shrift.116
auditors being asleep at the switch, contrary evidence may get short
And the worse the consequences of the audit failure, the more likely the jurors
17
are to blame the auditor, whatever the quality of the audit.'
Other cognitive limitations may affect the accuracy of the litigation sorting
process. The salience of audit failure may also trigger the availability heuristic,
further distorting jurors' judgment. 118 The fundamental attribution bias may
lead courts to exaggerate the influence of perceived disposition (for example,
fraud-prone) in explaining a person's behavior while overlooking the influence
of the person's particular circumstances in any given situation. 19 And given the
114 See Prentice, supra note 9, at 218 ("[I]n the general run of things, there is no reason
to suspect that auditors are auditing fraudulently or recklessly, any more than there is reason
to believe that drivers are driving recklessly. Most audits are completed competently, just as
most car trips are.").
115 See id. at 158-59 (discussing representativeness heuristic). Others have put forth
recommendations for "debiasing" human decisionmakers in the jury context (with respect in
particular to the hindsight bias). See Hal R. Arkes, Principlesin Judgment/Decision Making
Research Pertinent to Legal Proceedings, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 429, 450-51 (1989). These
attempts, however, have not met with much success. See, e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: DeterminingLiability in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89,
99 (1995).
116 See Clifford R. Mynatt et al., Information Relevance, Working Memory, and the
Consideration of Alternative, 46A Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 759, 759 (1993) (finding
that subjects who had developed a plausible hypothesis were less able to recognize
alternatives).
117Kathryn Kadous, The Effects of Audit Quality and Consequence Severity on Juror
Evaluations ofAuditor Responsibilityfor PlaintiffLosses, 75 ACCT. REv. 327, 328 (2000).
118 Under the availability heuristic, people place undue weight on recent events and
other readily available information. The availability heuristic may lead people to discount
excessively the possibility of losses from high magnitude but low probability risks if such a
loss has not occurred recently. Conversely, immediately after a loss does occur (for example,
an earthquake in San Francisco or a financial meltdown at Enron), people may exaggerate
the probability of future loss. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1127-28 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky &
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty] (describing the availability heuristic).
119See Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, "Nai've Cynicism" in Everyday Theories of
Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J.PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 743, 743-44 (1999); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral
Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 89 (2002)
("My suspicion, however, is that concealed compliance wrongdoing by agents is only
occasionally the product of inherently bad moral dispositions. More often, a morally normal
person gets caught in a situation that leads gradually to increasingly bad choices. Here, we
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disrepute that auditors have fallen into, evidence about the behavior of any
particular audit firm's
work may be viewed through the skewed lens of the
120
confirmation bias.
In the opposite direction, judges may rely on simple heuristic-like rules to
get cases off their dockets.' l 2 Judges may prefer to dispose of cases quickly,
particularly if securities law cases are a disfavored class due to their complexity
or other reasons. Although heuristics may cut down on decision-making costs,
they may not produce a rule of law that provides the most cost-effective
protection for investors and the capital markets.
The result of these conflicting biases is uncertainty, and defendants facing
potentially bankrupting judgments do not like uncertainty. Audit firms may
choose to settle-even when they have strong defenses-rather than put their
business fates in the hands of a judge or jury. As noted above, trials in
securities fraud class actions are as rare as the dodo.
The vagaries and expense of the litigation process dictate that a substantial
percentage of the audit fees charged by public accountants go to insuring
against litigation risk. Those fees, of course, are paid by corporations-and
therefore indirectly by the shareholders of those corporations. Shareholders
would be happy to shoulder the cost of the securities class action mill, ifit
imposed sanctions with sufficient accuracy to provide confidence that it
produced useful marginal deterrence above and beyond that already produced
by government enforcement and the market for reputation. 122 Unless litigation
produces a more precisely targeted sanction than the sanctions administered by
the SEC, PCAOB, and the market for reputation, it is difficult to say that it
produces much in the way of marginal deterrence. Simply adding to the
punitive weight of those other sources is unlikely to do much to push audit
firms toward higher quality auditing practices, given the questionable precision
of the current litigation regime.123

revisit the fundamental attribution bias: the idea that observers underestimate in others the
influence of situational factors, and overestimate character.").
120 The confirmation bias induces people to confirm prior decisions regardless of
whether the decisions were correct when made. See, e.g., Robert Forsythe et al., Anatomy of
an Experimental PoliticalStock Market, 82 Am.EcoN. REV. 1142, 1154-55 (1992); Charles
G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:The Effects of Prior Theories
on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098
(1979).
121 Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same
Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities FraudOpinions, 51
EMORY L.J. 83, 100-05; see Hillary A. Sale, JudgingHeuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903,

904 (2002). Donald C. Langevoort's response can be found in Donald C. Langevoort, Are
Judges Motivated To Create "Good" Securities FraudDoctrine?, 51 EMORY L.J. 309, 309
(2002).
122 John C. Coffee, Jr., UnderstandingEnron: "It'sAbout the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57

Bus. LAW. 1403, 1415 (2001-2002) (arguing that "a system of reputational intermediaries
works only if fault can be reliably assigned").
123I have proposed an alternative that I believe promises greater accuracy. A.C.
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal To Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as
Securities FraudEnforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999).
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The "IrrationalAuditor"

Another reason to question the role of litigation in promoting audit quality
is that lawsuits may do little to deter many of the causes of bad auditing.
Business professors Max Bazerman, George Lowenstein, and Don Moore paint
a bleak picture of the ability of accountants to respond to rational incentives,
arguing that "the corporate auditing arena is a particularly fertile ground for
self-serving biases." '1 24 Delving into the vast literature exploring the ways that
125
cognitive biases may influence auditors would be an article unto itself;
Bazerman et al.'s main points about auditors' cognitive limits suffice for our
purposes here:
Ambiguity. Bias thrives wherever there is the possibility of interpreting
information in different ways.... Auditors and their clients have
considerable leeway... in answering some of the most basic financial
questions: What's an investment? What's an expense? When should
revenue be recognized?...
Attachment. Auditors have strong business reasons to remain in clients'
good graces and are thus highly motivated to approve their clients'
accounts.... [O]nce people equate their own interests with another
party's, they interpret data to favor that party. Attachment breeds bias.
Approval. An audit ultimately endorses or rejects the client's accounting
-in other words, it assesses the judgments that someone in the client['s]
firm has already made. Research shows that self-serving biases become
even stronger when people are endorsing others' biased judgmentsprovided those judgments align with their own biases-than when they are
making original judgments themselves....

Familiarity. People are more willing to harm strangers than individuals
they know, especially when those individuals are paying clients with
whom they have ongoing relationships. An auditor who suspects
questionable accounting must thus choose, unconsciously perhaps,
between potentially harming his client (and himself) by challenging a
company's accounts or harming faceless investors by failing to object to
the possibly skewed numbers....
Discounting. People tend to be far more responsive to immediate
consequences than delayed ones, especially when the delayed outcomes
are uncertain.... [T]he costs of a positive report when a negative report
is called for-protecting the accounting firm's reputation or avoiding a
lawsuit, for example-are likely to be distant and uncertain....
124

See Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. Bus.

REv., Nov. 2002, at 97, 98-100.
125 Useful surveys include Robert Libby et al., Experimental Research in Financial
Accounting,
27
AcCT. ORG.
AND
SoC'y 775 (2001),
available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-261860, and Mark Nelson & Hun-Tong Tan, Judgment and
Decision Making Research in Auditing: A Task, Person, and Interpersonal Interaction
Perspective (Mar. 25, 2005), (http://ssm.com/abstract=761706).
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Escalation. It's natural for people to conceal or explain away minor
indiscretions or oversights, sometimes without even realizing that they're
doing it ....

It's our belief that some of the recent financial disasters

began as minor errors of judgment and escalated into
we've witnessed
126
corruption.
In sum, Bazerman, Lowenstein, and Moore argue that accountants may not
consciously tolerate fraud-it may frequently result instead from their cognitive
shortcomings. The audit context puts auditors in a situation where they are
particularly vulnerable to cognitive error.
If cognitive limitations are a central cause of audit failure, it has profound
127
implications for antifraud liability. Fraud traditionally requires scienter.
Presumably an auditor is not intentionally misleading anyone if she signs off on
false statements under the influence of a cognitive defect. Even recklessness
would seem a stretch: If cognitive defects, such as irrational optimism, are
pervasive, then a false statement that resulted from such a defect could not be a
departure from the standard of ordinary care because ordinary care would
arguably encompass the cognitive defect. Recklessness, of course, requires an
extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care. The work of the
behavioralists, however, shows us that cognitive biases are not only ordinary,
they are pervasive.
Could the risk of liability encourage audit firms to take measures to correct
the cognitive failings of the members of their audit teams? Cognitive defects
may be extremely difficult to overcome. "Research on motivated reasoning and
self-serving biases suggest.. •that those with conflicts of interest may be biased
in ways they are not consciously aware, and that they therefore may not be able
to correct these biases even when they try to do so."128 Moreover, experts, such
as accountants, tend to be overly optimistic in assessing their own decisionmaking ability. 129 As Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky put it, experts are "often
wrong but rarely in doubt."' 30 This confidence may cause auditors to discount
evidence of their own propensity for cognitive failure: "That other guy has
cognitive failings; I'm too smart for that."
Even if corrections are feasible, is litigation the correct lever to induce
such changes? Part of the difficulty with correcting cognitive failings is the
uncertainty about what measures will be effective in a particular, highly
specialized setting such as auditing. For example, perhaps the compensation

126 Bazerman et al.,

supra note 124, at 98-100.

127 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
128 Don A. Moore, George Loewenstein, and Max H. Bazerman, Auditor Independence,
Conflict of Interest, and the Unconscious Intrusion of Bias, (Harvard NOM Research Paper,

No. 02-40, 2002). On the possibility of corrective measures for cognitive failings, see Chip
Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for
Individual Shortcomings, 20 REs. ORG. BEHAv. 1, 3 (1998).
129 See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants

of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 427, 430 (1992).
"' Id. at 412.
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structures of accounting firms need to be adjusted. 13 1The adversarial process of
litigation, where the focus is on assigning blame, is unlikely to shed much light
on this topic. The audit firm will not be focused on the cause underlying the
audit failure, but instead on justifying the adequacy of its procedures. This
tendency will be exacerbated by the perception among auditors-warranted or
not-that securities fraud class actions are largely random occurrences. The
specialized expertise of the PCAOB, with its staff exposed to many diverse
audit contexts, seems much more likely to generate useful measures to improve
the auditing process. And the PCAOB's legitimacy
as an expert regulator
1 32
makes its recommendations much more palatable.'
In sum, if cognitive defects lead auditors to sign off on misleading
financial statements, imposing anti-fraud liability on those auditors serves no
useful purpose. Liability would be pointless in changing behavior. Imposing
liability for misstatements would simply transfer money from audit firms to
investors and lawyers, with no reduction in fraud. In that scenario, auditor
liability needlessly reduces social welfare and more specifically, investor
wealth.
C. The Effect ofLitigation on the Quantityand Quality of Information

In addition to concems about the precision and efficacy of litigation as a
deterrent, there are also reasons to worry about the way that litigation interacts
with the other legs of the audit quality triad. Litigation is supposed to
complement regulation and reputation. There are reasons to believe, however,
that litigation actually undermines those approaches. Even more worrisome, the
specter of litigation may be having a deleterious effect on the usefulness of
financial statements.
1. Regulation and Reputation

Perhaps the most important work product that the PCAOB is likely to
generate will be the inspection reports that it is required to produce after each
inspection of a registered accounting firm. These reports promise to offer
important information about the quality of auditing, information that is likely to
be critical to the market in evaluating an auditor's reputation.
Unfortunately, the usefulness of the PCAOB's inspection reports is
hamstrung by litigation fears. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and PCAOB
rules, the Board must provide a copy of each inspection report, in appropriate

131 Elliott J. Weiss, Some Thoughts on an Agenda for the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 53 DUKE L.J. 491, 502 (2003) (arguing that "the Board should require
registered public accounting firms to adopt incentive systems that promote, rather than
threaten, the independent performance by audit partners and employees of their public
responsibilities").
132See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN, 255, 259 (1999) (concluding that "when people

perceive accountability as illegitimate, such undesired effects as attitude polarization away
from the advocated position, decline in intrinsic motivation, and excessive stress are all
possible responses").
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detail, to the SEC and to certain state regulatory authorities.' 33 Portions of those
reports are also made available to the public, subject to restrictions in the Act
that prohibit, or require a delay in, the public disclosure of certain
information. 134 The public portions of the inspection reports include
descriptions of the types of matters on which the Board focused its inspection
procedures, the procedures the Board staff carried out to examine those matters,
and descriptions of issues identified by Board staff in the course of the
inspection, such as apparent departures from auditing standards, related
standards, and the quality
attestation standards, ethical standards, independence
135
control policies and procedures of the firm itself.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act limits public access, however, to portions of the
inspection report criticizing potential defects in the quality control systems of
the firm under inspection. If a final report identified quality control defects, the
firm may demonstrate to the director of the PCAOB Division of Registration
and Inspections that it has remedied the defects within twelve months. If the
defects were successfully remedied, the defects will not be made public.1 36 The
Board is further restricted from publicizing any information subject to the
protection of section 105(b)(5)(A) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.' 37 The Board is
therefore prohibited from releasing any documents or information specifically
acquired by the Board, and any related Board deliberations in connection with
an inspection.
Criticisms and defects in auditing practices are withheld from the public
because, as a policy matter, "[t]he Board is concerned that discussing aspects of
a firm's quality controls, in a context where criticisms and potential defects
cannot be discussed, may create a distorted and misleading impression.' ' 138 This
rationale does not hold up to serious scrutiny. If the PCAOB is concerned about
creating "a distorted and misleading impression" in the minds of users of
financial statements, it is not clear why its "criticisms and potential defects
cannot be discussed." Firms subject to a report are provided a draft of the
inspection report to that firm. The firm is entitled to respond to the draft within
thirty days indicating for which portions of the report they request
confidentiality. 139 This thirty-day review period, however, would give the
133 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(g), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(g) (Supp. 2001-2003).
134Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(g)(2) (Supp. 2001-2003).
135Statement Concerning the Issuance of Inspection Reports, PCAOB Release No.
104-2004-001 at 6 (Aug. 24, 2004), available at: http://www.pcaobus.org/Inspections/
StatementConcerningInspectionReports.pdf.
136 PCAOB Rule 4009, RULES OF THE BOARD (Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.

pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules-of the Board/Section 4.pdf. The PCAOB issued "Limited
Inspection Reports" in August 2004 for the Big Four firms, so if any of the deficiencies
identified in the course of the PCAOB's inspections have not been corrected by the firms,
the PCAOB should soon make public those deficiencies. PCAOB Release No. 104-2004001, supra note 135, at 6. The inspection reports are now available at the PCAOB's website,
http://www.pcaobus.org/inspections.
137Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(g)(2) (Supp. 2001-2003).
138PCAOB Release No. 104-2004-001, supra note 135, at 5.
139 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104(f), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(f) (Supp. 2001-2003).
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auditing firm plenty of time to prepare a response and release it simultaneously
with the PCAOB's report. The more likely parties to suffer from a distorted and
misleading impression are plaintiffs' lawyers, who would be avid readers of
such reports in their quest for litigation fodder. What better evidence of
accounting incompetence, i.e., "recklessness," than criticism from the experts at
the PCAOB?
Greater publicity of findings of material weaknesses in audit procedures
would provide more of a deterrent for audit firms to do a good job with their
audits. Reputation is critical to auditors. Providing the public with information
to assess the adequacy and thoroughness of the auditor's work, however, stands
in tension with the audit finns' litigation concerns. Public airing of weaknesses
in their audit procedures would quickly find their way into complaints.
Similarly, making documents provided to the PCAOB publicly available would
be very tempting to current and prospective private litigants.
The fear of litigation may affect not just the information available to the
reputational market. The risk of litigation may also impair audit quality more
directly, by undermining the incentive of audit firms to discipline their partners.
As George Benston explains: "Should the firms fire or otherwise punish a
partner for having supervised and approved an incompetent or inadequate audit
or for having agreed too readily to a client's demands, the firm would be
admitting its collective guilt to regulators and present, or potential,
plaintiffs. 140 Perhaps the firing of a partner for doing bad audit work is even
more persuasive evidence than criticism coming from the PCAOB. Under the
current liability regime, the rational response for the audit firm in the wake of
an audit failure is to circle the wagons rather than cut the deficient partner
loose.
2.

The Usefulness of FinancialStatements

The threat of securities fraud class actions also has potentially perverse
consequences for users of financial statements. To stave off litigation, auditing
firms continually push the FASB for more and more detailed rules. As Bill
Bratton notes: "Auditors in this country like rules. They want more of them.
Indeed, the then Big Five accounting firms responded to the Enron crisis b
demanding more rules and blaming regulators for failing to supply them."
The affection of auditors for rules is understandable-the more detailed the
rules, the better auditors can defend themselves against charges of a negligent
audit by demonstrating that the financial statements 42were prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.1
140
141

Benston, supra note 17, at 1345.
William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus

Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1023, 1045 (2003).
142 Id. More detailed standards also bolster the auditor's willingness to resist pressure
from the client to fudge the numbers-if the rules are clear, no independent auditor is likely
to sign off on their violation, so "shopping" for a more compliant auditor is pointless. See
Benston, supra note 17, at 1335 ("Accounting standards are particularly advantageous to
[independent public accountants] as a means of withstanding pressure from clients to sign
statements that are potentially misleading, if not fraudulent.").
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The problem is that as accounting principles become more detailed,
financial statements may become so complex that they are rendered opaque to
even the informed user, much less the average investor. Moreover, increased
complexity may create greater space for manipulation.143 And if complexity is
accompanied by subjectivity in application, the auditor will have a difficult
time resisting pressures from the client to approve a more favorable
treatment. 144 The fog engendered by complex accounting standards is further
fueled by complex financial structures. For example, the financial engineering
that goes into the creation of derivative securities creates a virtually infinite
range of securities types.' 4 5 This flexibility creates considerable room for
polishing a company's financial picture. By applying very precise rules to
complicated financial structures, we may end up with financial statements that
are very extensive, but which shed very little light on the financial health of an
enterprise.
IV. WHAT SHOULD THE STANDARD BE?
So far I have offered reasons to question the calls for more stringent
liability for auditors. For some readers, my arguments will invite the question:
Why not eliminate auditor liability altogether? The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA) did not eliminate, but merely limited, the liability
exposure faced by auditors. The Act adopts proportionate, rather than joint and
several, liability for defendants who are not found to have knowingly violated
the securities laws. 14 6 That protection is most important for secondary
defendants, such as accountants, lawyers and investment bankers, who may be
implicated in frauds that will typically be orchestrated by the insiders of their
corporate clients. 47 If those secondary defendants can show that they did not
know of the fraud, their liability exposure will be limited substantially.
The PSLRA does not let secondary defendants off scot-free. Proportionate
liability does not mean that accountants are immune from liability. It only
means that they are responsible only for the incremental harm caused by their
participation in the fraud. Prior to the PSLRA, plaintiffs' lawyers routinely
went after accountants even if their culpability for the fraud was slight,
143

Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient CapitalMarkets, CorporateDisclosure,and Enron, 89

CORNELL L. REV. 394, 421 (2004) ("The current, highly technical accounting system is easy
to manipulate because of its complexity, and firms will take advantage of this fact because of
the intense pressure to produce a profit.").
14 Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate
Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 17 (2004) ("As the accounting norms
themselves became more complicated and subjective, the ability to confidently say 'no' to a
client diminished.").
145 Id. at 11-12 ("the fact that each derivative is customized makes valuation difficult
individually and impossible in the aggregate. The contingencies written into the
arrangements are mind-numbingly intricate.").
146 Securities Exchange Act § 21D(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f(2) (2000).
147 On the liability standards for secondary defendants generally, see Jill E. Fisch, The
Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In search of Liability Standards for Secondary
Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1293 (1999).
HeinOnline -- 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 53 2006

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1

particularly when the audit client had gone bankrupt. It seems clear that the
auditors were excessively exposed under the old regime, and the exposure
varied in a rather haphazard fashion, correlating largely with the depth of the
auditor's pocket. If larger firms produce higher quality audits, this effect is
perverse. Under the PSLRA, defendants who are only tangentially involved in
the fraud will not face potentially bankrupting liability, so accountants do not
have to serve as quasi-guarantors for the solvency of their clients.
But auditors who actively participate in the fraud get no such relief. Under
the PSLRA, defendants are only entitled to the protection of proportionate
liability when they lack knowledge of the fraud. Even then they can be required
to pay an additional fifty percent above the damages based on their fault if the
issuer is insolvent. 148 Proportionate liability offers no protection at all for
secondary defendants if a jury concludes that they were knee deep in the fraud.
Accountants must still consider the risk of a securities fraud class action when a
client tries to pressure them into acquiescing in a dubious interpretation of
accounting principles.
Should we go further and eliminate liability for auditors altogether? This
step would eliminate the deleterious effect that the threat of litigation has on the
regulation of auditors and the reputational market, not to mention the deadweight cost of the litigation itself. A broad immunity, however, also would
excuse those auditors who knowingly acquiesce in their clients' frauds. (To be
sure, the threat of enforcement by the SEC and PCAOB would remain.) At a
minimum, a broad immunity would not be politically feasible.
So, if we are to retain liability for auditors, we are left with the question:
knowledge or recklessness? Answering this question is hard, primarily because
of the difficulty in determining how common knowing acquiescence is,
although one suspects that it is much less common than the frequency of
negligence. The ratio of the latter to the former is important-the knowing
fraud is something that we believe that the threat of litigation can usually deter
if the probability of enforcement and the sanctions assessed are high enough.
For the cognitive reasons set forth above, however, we are much less sanguine
that the merely negligent acts are as likely to be deterred. The line between
negligence and recklessness is far from bright, and many cases of negligence
will be sufficient to get past a motion to dismiss, thereby creating at least some
settlement value. Thus, there is an argument for requiring the pleading of
knowledge by the auditor in all cases.
A stringent knowledge standard, however, poses the risk that even some
knowing frauds will go unsanctioned. When we are talking about primary
violators (i.e., the corporate insiders), that risk of unsanctioned fraud would be
clearly unacceptable. But as an incremental reform to further protect auditors
(who already enjoy proportionate liability for reckless fraud) from the risk of
frivolous suit or even an arguably meritorious suit that is unlikely to deter, a
consistent knowledge standard for liability (not just relief from joint and
several liability) is something that should be considered for accountants if we
148 Securities Exchange Act § 21D(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(24) (2000).
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are going to keep the costs of audits manageable for public companies.
Moreover, a knowledge standard would ensure that actions against auditors
were more precisely targeted than under the current regime. A finding of
liability under a knowledge standard would send a much stronger signal to
regulators and users of financial statements, thereby enhancing the efficiency of
the reputational market for auditors.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have raised a number of reasons to question the call for
greater liability for auditors. My overall theme has been that litigation is a
substitute for regulation and the market for reputation, not a complement, and
arguably a poor one in the context of promoting audit quality. The new
regulatory regime faced by auditors of public companies in the post-SarbanesOxley world substantially undercuts the arguments for imposing liability on
auditors. The marginal deterrence provided by the threat of litigation is
substantially reduced under that stringent new regulatory structure. If we know
of ways that auditors can improve their auditing practices in a cost justified
way, the PCAOB can (and should) require them. We do not need the (very
expensive) stick of class actions to make the auditors improve their procedures.
And the class action threat is limiting the available information about audit
quality.
Behavioral economics give further reason to doubt the efficacy of
litigation in promoting audit quality. We do not know how many audit failures
result from the cognitive biases of "irrational auditors" and how many result
from sloth and indifference. Indeed, it seems likely that many audit problems
will stem from a combination of both. Combining this uncertainty over the
source of audit failure with the very real possibility that the management team
of the audit client has been actively and energetically concealing its fraudulent
behavior, the challenge of assigning "the cause" of the audit failure becomes
exceedingly complex. Only an irrationally optimistic believer in the efficacy of

the litigation process could trust it to sort out this complexity. In the real world,
irrational liability is not likely to cure the problem of the irrational auditor.
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